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ABSTRACT 
Sleep deprivation has been shown to alter decision-making abilities. The majority of 
research has utilized fairly complex tasks with the goal of emulating ’real-life’ scenarios. 
Here, we use a Lottery Choice Task (LCT) which assesses risk and ambiguity 
preference for both decisions involving potential gains and those involving potential 
losses. We hypothesized that one night of sleep deprivation would make subjects more 
risk seeking in both gains and losses. Both a control group and an experimental group 
took the LCT on two consecutive days, with an intervening night of either sleep or sleep 
deprivation. The control group demonstrated that there was no effect of repeated 
administration of the LCT. For the experimental group, results showed significant 
interactions of night (normal sleep versus total sleep deprivation, TSD) by frame (gains 
versus losses), which demonstrate that following as little as 23 h of TSD, the 
prototypical response to decisions involving risk is altered. Following TSD, subjects 
were willing to take more risk than they ordinarily would when they were considering a 
gain, but less risk than they ordinarily would when they were considering a loss. For 
ambiguity preferences, there seems to be no direct effect of TSD. These findings 
suggest that, overall, risk preference is moderated by TSD, but whether an individual is 
willing to take more or less risk than when well-rested depends on whether the decision 
is framed in terms of gains or losses. 
 
 
ARTICLE 
Total sleep deprivation (TSD) has been shown to cause cognitive performance deficits 
in a wide range of domains, including alertness, attention, motor responses, inhibition, 
and many working memory functions (Chee and Choo, 2004; Chuah et al., 2006; 
Dinges et al., 1997; Pilcher and Huffcutt, 1996). One area not well studied, though, is 
the effect of TSD on decision making, which involves both convergent and divergent 
skills (Harrison and Horne, 2000). While early studies assumed that decision making is 
too complex to be sensitive to the effects of TSD because of the demanding and highly 
motivating conditions (Corcoran, 1963; Horne and Pettitt, 1985; Wilkinson, 1965, 1992), 
the few studies that have directly examined this question suggest that TSD does indeed 
impact decision making. 
 
The majority of research studying the effects of TSD on decision making have utilized 
fairly complex tasks with the goal of emulating ’real-life’ scenarios (Harrison and Horne, 
1999; Linde et al., 1999; Wimmer et al., 1992). For example, Harrison and Horne 
reported a business simulation game where subjects needed to market a business and 
earn a profit by reacting to other players and external information provided about the 
’market place’. In that study, subjects were less successful running the business while 
sleep deprived. However, due to the design of the task, that study was unable to identify 
any particular decisions or particular components of decision making that were 
specifically impaired by TSD. Other studies have administered tasks aimed at more 
specific aspects of decision making, such as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT 
emphasizes the learning of reward and punishment associations to guide ongoing 
decision making. In the IGT, subjects select cards from among a series of decks and 
either win or lose money based on the card drawn. There are two decks of cards which 
carry an overall loss and two decks which carry an overall gain. The cards that carry an 
overall loss offer immediate high rewards with a concomitant risk of occasional very 
high loss. The desks with an overall gain, on the other hand, have smaller immediate 
rewards, but lower risk of a loss. Typically, subjects learn to avoid the former, riskier 
decks and focus on the latter decks carrying an overall gain (Bechara et al., 1994, 
2005). Harrison and Horne found that sleep-deprived subjects are less concerned with 
negative consequences when faced with high rewards on the ’overall loss’ desk during 
this task (Harrison and Horne, 1998, 2000). More recently, Killgore et al. (2006) similarly 
reported that 49.5 h of TSD impairs the ability to weigh immediate short-term benefits 
against long-term penalties on the IGT. These studies demonstrate that decision-
making processes are, in fact, modified during sleep deprivation. The work on the IGT 
suggests that individuals may be willing to take more risk during TSD than they would 
when well rested, but the IGT entails a complex assessment of risk taking (Bechara et 
al., 2005), and therefore only provides an indirect assessment. Additionally, during the 
IGT subjects are asked to make choices in an environment with missing information (i.e. 
there are unknown probabilities in the odds of winning or losing) and thus probability 
assessments are confounded with risk preferences. There are no published studies of 
which we are aware that utilize a simple measure to directly study risk preferences 
during TSD. The aim of the present study was to measure potential changes in risk 
preference, along with the preference for ambiguity in risk decisions, during TSD. 
 
The study of risk in the context of decision making has been an interest in 
microeconomics for the last century. However, it has only received attention from 
psychologists in the last few decades (Trepel et al., 2005). The concept of risk varies 
depending on the context and situation. In economics, risk is commonly associated with 
the variance of the outcome (pay-off) distribution. For example, one gamble may offer 
$80 if a coin shows heads and $20 if shows tails while another may offer $60 if a coin 
shows heads and $40 if shows tails. In both gambles, the expected pay-off is $50, but 
as the variance is higher in the first gamble, that gamble carries higher risk. Real-world 
decisions that illustrate these concepts of risk and pay-offs would include 
investment/savings decisions, surgical alternatives or military operational decisions. 
Two variables that may influence one’s preference for risk when it is defined in this 
manner are: (1) whether the gamble involves decisions about gains or about losses; 
and (2) whether all the relevant odds are known or if some are unknown. When some of 
the odds are unknown, usually due to missing information, this is said to introduce 
’ambiguity’. So, with ambiguity, the level of risk is unclear, as if the coin-flip involved a 
coin that may or may not have a both heads and tails side (i.e. it is unknown to the 
decision maker). With investment/savings choices, for example, if companies included 
in a mutual fund are unknown, then the choice to invest in that mutual fund involves an 
ambiguous gamble. 
 
Decision-making research has shown that, when the odds are known, individuals are 
risk seeking for losses but risk avoiding for gains (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Smith et al., 2002). This means that, on average, if faced with two 
options that can each lead to a loss, individuals choose the more risky option, and if 
faced with two options that can each lead to a gain, individuals choose the less risky 
option. So, if someone is trying to minimize a loss, they will take a more risky option if 
they believe it may mitigate against the size of the loss. If, on the other hand, someone 
is trying to maximize overall gain, they are likely to take the less risky choice so as to 
increase the likelihood of gaining at least something. Ambiguity preference is less well 
studied, with some inconsistent results. However, there is some consensus that 
individuals are ambiguity avoiding for gains while ambiguity neutral for losses. This 
means individuals choose a known gamble over an ambiguous one when faced with 
possible gains, but they chose the option with known odds and the option with 
ambiguous (i.e. not fully known) odds equally often when faced with losses (Cohen et 
al., 1987; Curley and Yates, 1985; Hsu et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2002). 
 
To assess the degree to which risk and ambiguity preferences change during sleep 
deprivation, we used the Lottery Choice Task (LCT) reported by Smith et al. (2002). 
This task assesses risk and ambiguity preference separately for decisions involving 
potential gains and those involving potential losses. Based on the general literature on 
risk preference and on TSD research with the IGT, we hypothesized that: (1) well-rested 
subjects would be risk seeking for losses and risk avoiding for gains, while ambiguity 
neutral for losses and ambiguity avoiding for gains; and (2) sleep-deprived subjects 
would become more risk seeking for both gains and losses. 
 
Methods 
Subjects and conditions 
A total of 26 young adults performed this task as part of two larger sleep-deprivation 
studies (eight women; mean age: 23.5 ± 5.3 years; education: 14.7 ± 1.7 years). 
Additionally, 12 young adults participated in a control group that involved no sleep 
deprivation (six women; mean age: 24.2 ± 4.3 years; education: 15.2 ± 2.4 years). All 
subjects in both groups were healthy as established by a physical examination, routine 
laboratory tests, and interviews covering medical and psychiatric histories. Subjects 
completed sleep diaries and wore actigraphs for 2 weeks prior to the study to document 
adherence to regular sleep–wake schedules. Subjects in the experimental group 
obtained a nightly average of 408 ± 69 min of sleep for the week prior to the study. 
Subjects in the control group obtained a nightly average of 421.8 ± 71 min of sleep. All 
subjects were tested twice, on two consecutive days, at approximately the same time of 
day in the morning. The control group had a normal night of sleep at home in between 
test administrations. The sleep-deprived experimental group had an average of 22.7 ± 
.58 h of TSD between test administrations. 
 
Lottery Choice Task 
The LCT used in the present study is a shortened version of one used by Smith et al. 
(2002), which is based on Ellsberg (1961). The LCT examines risk and ambiguity 
preference by asking subjects to make a series of choices between two gambles with 
equal expected pay-offs but different risk levels. The LCT was comprised of four 
conditions, as decisions focused on either risk or ambiguity and involved either gains or 
losses: Known-risk decisions involving gains (RG), known-risk decisions involving 
losses (RL), ambiguous-risk decisions involving gains (AG), and ambiguous-risk 
decisions involving losses (AL). See Fig. 1 for examples of the choices presented to 
subjects. In the RG and RL conditions (e.g. Fig. 1A), if a subject chooses the lower risk 
gamble, that decision is classified as being risk averse, and if the higher risk option is 
taken, that decision is classified as risk seeking. As discussed above, when one of the 
gamble choices does not clearly define the odds of each outcome, the gamble is said to 
be ambiguous (e.g. Fig. 1B). To examine whether subjects avoid or seek ambiguity, the 
LCT includes conditions where one of the gambles in each paired choice is ambiguous 
(see below for a description of how seek/avoid is determined for ambiguous gambles). 
Finally, because preferences may differ when gambles involve losses relative to gains, 
the LCT includes decisions where both options involve losing money and others where 
both options involve gaining money. This is true for both decisions with known odds and 
those with ambiguous odds. 
 
Figure 1.  Lottery Choice Task paradigm two examples of the stimuli used to present the gamble choices 
to subjects. (a) An example from the known-risk decisions involving gains (RG) condition. The gamble on 
the left has a smaller variance and is considered less risky than the gamble on the right. (b) An example 
from the ambiguous-risk decisions involving gains (AG) condition. The gamble on the left is ambiguous, 
while the gamble on the right is identical to the riskier gamble in the RG condition. The three boxes 
indicate the color of the chip associated with each gamble. Note that only examples from the ‘gains’ 
conditions are shown. Loss conditions are identically structured, but have negative dollar amounts 
associated with the chips. [R] is for red, [B] for blue, and [Y] for yellow. This figure also serves to show an 
example of a known-risk and an ambiguous-risk decisions that were paired for calculating ambiguity 
preference (see text for detailed explanation), as each gamble 2 has an identical pay-off variance. 
 
Ten decisions were made on gambles in a known-risk condition (five for gains and five 
for losses) and 10 decisions were made on gambles in an ambiguous-risk condition 
(five for gains and five for losses). For all choices, subjects were shown two containers 
of red, blue, and yellow chips, where the number of each color was defined within the 
gamble stimuli (see Fig. 1). For known-risk decisions, subjects were asked to decide 
between two risky options that each had known (but different) odds of either winning 
(RG) or losing (RL) specific amounts of money, but with identical expected pay-offs (see 
Fig. 1A). In both choices there are 20 red, 20 blue, and 20 yellow chips in the container, 
but the monetary value of each color is different in gamble 1 compared with gamble 2. 
The arrows in Fig. 1A indicate the amount of money that a subject can gain if that color 
chip is chosen. Gamble 1 is less risky than gamble 2 because the variance of the gains 
is smaller for gamble 1. Thus, if a subject chooses gamble 1, they are determined to be 
avoiding risk for that specific decision. If, on the other hand, they choose gamble 2, then 
they are seeking risk. The known-risk decisions involving losses follow the same format, 
but the monetary values are negative rather than positive. 
 
Again, following Smith et al., the ambiguous-risk condition decision stimuli are identical 
to the known-risk condition decision stimuli with the exception that the exact numbers of 
blue and yellow chips in gamble 1 are unknown (see Fig. 1B). In the ambiguous-risk 
condition, the arrows from the monetary outcome for both the yellow and blue chips 
converge on 40. This indicates that there were 40 total blue and yellow chips, but the 
subject did not know the exact number of each individually (e.g. there could have been 
eight blue and 32 yellow chips or 19 blue and 21 yellow chips, etc.). As is done in Fig. 1, 
each set of choices in the ambiguous-risk condition was matched with a similar set of 
choices from the known-risk condition such that each matched item shared a common 
gamble 2. Thus, the ambiguous choice was always gamble 1. Assessment of ambiguity 
preference then required considering both of the matched decisions (risk and ambiguity) 
and use of the assumption of transitivity (Smith et al., 2002). Transitivity is the 
preference assumption that states that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, 
then A is preferred to C. In the context of this task, if a subject avoids the riskier gamble 
in the known-risk condition, but chooses the riskier gamble in the matched ambiguous-
risk condition, s/he would be determined to be avoiding ambiguity (because to again 
avoid risk would have required the subject to choose the ambiguous gamble). 
Alternatively, if a subject chose the riskier gamble in the known-risk condition and then 
chose the ambiguous gamble in the matched ambiguous-risk condition s/he would be 
determined to be seeking ambiguity (because to again seek risk would have required 
them to choose the non-ambiguous gamble – gamble 2 in Fig. 1B). Finally, if the subject 
chose the riskier gamble in both conditions, or avoided risk in both conditions, then their 
ambiguity preference was deemed indeterminate. This is because it is unclear, in the 
first case, whether the subject actively avoided ambiguity or simply again sought risk 
during the ambiguous-risk condition. 
 
Procedures 
Subjects performed two distinct decision-making tasks (one of which was the LCT) in 
both the first and second testing sessions. For the LCT, the five decisions to be made 
for each condition were presented on a single piece of paper, and the order of 
conditions was randomly counterbalanced for each session. Similarly, two different 
versions of the task were developed and the order of presentation was counterbalanced 
across subjects. All subjects began the experiment with an endowment of $25. They 
were told that their decisions would either increase or decrease this amount and that 
they would be paid their final balance at the end. They were also informed of the 
method by which their decisions would be played out. Specifically, at the end of the 
second session, a single decision from the gains conditions (RG and AG) and a single 
decision from the loss conditions (RL and AL) for each of the two sessions (four total 
decisions) were randomly selected and the subject’s preferred gamble choice (gamble 1 
or gamble 2) was played out to determine final cash pay-off from the LCT. For each of 
the four decisions selected, the subject blindly drew one chip from the relevant 
container and either won or lost the amount of money associated with that chip. This 
payout procedure was only conducted following the second administration of the task. 
Subjects were not given any feedback between sessions (i.e. there was no 
determination of winnings or losses) so there would not be an opportunity for knowledge 
of money won or lost in the first session to alter decisions made in the second session. 
For ethical reasons, subjects could not owe the experimenters at the end of the study, 
so any negative payout balance was rounded to $0. 
 
Data Analysis 
The raw count data (i.e. the number of risk- or ambiguity-seeking decisions made per 
condition) were converted into proportional data. However, these data had significantly 
non-normal distributions on both nights (based on the kurtosis and skewness of the 
distributions). Therefore, the data were converted into risk preference and ambiguity 
preference scores. For the known-risk conditions (RG and RL), this was done by taking 
the proportion of the risk-avoiding responses minus the proportion of risk-seeking 
responses for each condition. Thus, a score of zero indicates someone who is risk 
neutral, increasing scores in the positive direction indicate greater risk avoidance, and 
increasing scores in the negative direction indicate greater risk seeking. The same 
procedure was followed for the ambiguous-risk conditions (AG and AL) to determine 
ambiguity preference. Using this ’preference’ metric has two advantages: (1) the 
distribution of these scores was normal; and (2) this is the same way in which Smith et 
al. (2002) treated the data in their study. 
 
Group analyses were conducted separately for the known-risk and ambiguous-risk 
conditions. For both, the initial omnibus analysis was a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-effects anova 
(frame by session by group). The effect of interest here was the three-way interaction, 
as it evaluated whether the two groups showed differential patterns of change across 
sessions. To follow-up a significant interaction, we examined the frame-by-session two-
way interaction separately for each group with repeated measures anova. If that 
interaction was significant, we then examined the source of the interaction by testing the 
main effect of session for each level of the variable frame (i.e. gains and losses). This 
tests whether there is a session effect (e.g. an effect of TSD in the experimental group) 
for either gains or losses. If the two-way interaction was not significant for a given 
group, we examined the simple main effects of session and frame. For the control group 
(where we anticipated a non-significant interaction) the session main effect addresses 
whether this task shows repeated administration effects (e.g. learning effects), while the 
frame main effect tests whether our subjects show the same preference differences 
across gains and losses as typically reported in the literature. 
 
Finally, to confirm that there were no baseline differences between the groups at 
session 1 that may confound any potential differential session effects observed in the 
preceding analysis, we conducted a between-groups manova for the session 1 data 
where the response variables were the preference scores for the four conditions (RG, 
RL, AG and AL). If this manova was significant, univariate analyses for each condition 
were conducted. 
 
Results 
See Table 1 for the risk and ambiguity preference scores from each group in each session.  
 
 
 
Known-risk condition (RG and RL) 
 
The omnibus mixed model ANOVA (frame by session by group) showed a significant 
three-way interaction (F1,36 = 5.70, P = 0.022, partial η2 = 0.137). As stated above, this 
was followed by analyzing the frame-by-session two-way interaction for each group. 
For the control group, the frame-by-session interaction was not significant (P = 0.536, 
partial η2 = 0.036; see Fig. 2). The main effects for the control group revealed a 
significant effect of frame (F1,25 = 45.34, P < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.805), but no significant 
change across sessions (P = 0.359, partial η2 = 0.077). The control group showed risk 
aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Change in preference following repeated administration to control group. The plotted points 
indicate the risk and ambiguity preference scores (measured in proportions) for each frame type for both 
sessions. Positive values indicate avoiding behavior, negative numbers indicate seeking behavior, and 
zero indicates risk or ambiguity neutrality. 
 
For the experimental group, the frame (RG versus RL)-by-session (well-rested versus 
TSD) interaction was significant (F1,25 = 10.55, P = 0.003, partial η2 = 0.297; see Fig. 3). 
Follow-up analyses focusing on the effect of session within frame showed that subjects 
became significantly less risk avoiding for gains after TSD (t25 = 2.30, P = 0.03, 
η2 = 0.175). Subjects became less risk seeking for losses after TSD, although this 
change was not significant (t25 = −1.80, P = 0.084, η2 = 0.115). 
 
Figure 3.  Change in preference following TSD in the experimental group. The plotted points indicate the 
risk and ambiguity preference scores (measured in proportions) for each frame type when well rested and 
after TSD. Positive values indicate avoiding behavior, negative numbers indicate seeking behavior, and 
zero indicates risk or ambiguity neutrality. 
 
In examining baseline group differences at session 1, the MANVOA was not significant 
(Wilks’λ, P < 0.724; partial η2 = 0.059), confirming there were no group differences at 
baseline (Table 1). 
 
Ambiguous risk condition (AG and AL) 
The omnibus mixed model ANOVA (frame by session by group) did not show a significant 
three-way interaction (P = 0.258; partial η2 = 0.035). The only significant effect in this 
ANOVA was the main effect of frame (F1,36 = 11.50, P = 0.002; partial η2 = 0.242). 
Averaged across both groups and both sessions, subjects showed greater ambiguity-
avoiding preferences for gains than for losses. To clarify this effect, simple main effects 
were conducted comparing ambiguity preferences for gains and losses to neutral (i.e. a 
preference score = 0). These analyses showed that subjects were ambiguity avoiding 
for gains (t37 = 2.38, P = 0.02, η2 = 0.133) and ambiguity seeking for losses (t37 = −2.22, 
P = 0.03, η2 = 0.118), although only the former would survive a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons, suggesting that subjects are actually ambiguity neutral for losses. 
 
Payout information 
The final payout amounts (including the endowment) for the experimental group were 
(mean ± SD) $26.23 ± 23.4, with a range of $0–67. Final payout amounts for the control 
group were $21.25 ± 24.4, with a range of $0–55. 
 
Discussion 
The LCT used in the present study assessed preference for both risk and ambiguity by 
having participants make a series of decisions between two gambles to maximize pay-
offs. Consistent with the large body of literature on risk preference (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Smith et al., 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the 
results of the control group and the well-rested condition in the experimental group 
demonstrate that subjects are risk avoiding for gains and risk seeking for losses in the 
known-risk condition. For the ambiguous-risk condition, well-rested subjects are 
ambiguity avoiding for gains and ambiguity neutral for losses. Together, these results 
replicate the study of Smith et al. (2002). The interactions of night (normal sleep versus 
TSD) by frame (gains versus losses) demonstrate that following as little as 23 h of TSD, 
the prototypical response to decisions involving risk is altered. Sleep-deprived subjects 
are less risk avoiding for gains and less risk seeking for losses. In other words, following 
TSD, subjects were willing to take more risk than they ordinarily would when they were 
considering a gain, but less risk than they ordinarily would when they were considering 
a loss. For ambiguity, there seems to be no direct effect of TSD on decisions involving 
uncertainty. 
 
TSD changes risk preferences 
Overall then, it appears that one night of TSD moderates sensitivity to risk. The change 
in risk preferences following sleep loss may reflect a change in decision-making 
strategies that varies for gain versus loss. For the known-risk condition, the 
hypothesized increase in risk-seeking behavior was observed in the RG condition, but 
not the RL condition. The RG data are also consistent with prior studies of the IGT 
showing that subjects seem to favor risk during sleep deprivation (Harrison and Horne, 
1998; Killgore et al., 2006). One difference between the IGT and the LCT task used 
here is that the present task allows for the differentiation between decisions involving 
gains and those involving losses while the IGT does not. Our data suggest the change 
in risk preference during TSD depends on whether the decision is framed in terms of 
gains or in terms of losses. As the IGT places an emphasis on gains, that may explain 
the increased risk seeking on the IGT during sleep deprivation. Thus, our data 
demonstrate the importance of analyzing the framing of decisions (i.e. gains versus 
losses) when trying to understand risk preference during sleep loss. 
 
Unlike for the known-risk condition, subjects were essentially always neutral towards 
ambiguity (statistically, they did show a slight preference to avoid ambiguity for gains). It 
may be that the missing information of an ambiguous gamble results in no stable 
strategy. Individuals may not know exactly how to assess risk when faced with 
ambiguity and thus not respond with any consistent pattern at the group level. The 
exception to this interpretation in the present study was the fact the subjects were 
slightly, but significantly, ambiguity avoiding for decision involving gains. The significant 
difference from neutrality (i.e. an ambiguity preference score of zero) should be 
interpreted with caution considering that there is no effect of TSD and the effect is very 
small (Cohen, 1988). When compared with risk, much less research has been 
conducted on ambiguity, and we are not aware of other studies directly assessing this 
construct during sleep deprivation. 
 
Potential cognitive mechanisms 
The exact cognitive mechanism underlying changes in risk preference with sleep 
deprivation cannot be ascertained from this study. Nonetheless, one way to approach 
this question is to consider whether a common mechanism can explain the changes 
seen here both for risky decisions involving gains and those involving losses, as well as 
the previous work with the IGT. For example, in all cases, one can interpret the data as 
showing that individuals become less sensitive to risk following sleep loss. This may be 
due to an impaired ability to accurately assess risk (e.g. calculation of the odds of 
various outcomes). If subjects view the same situation as less risky after TSD, even with 
well-defined gambles, the predicted outcome would be exactly what we report: less risk 
avoidance for gains and less risk seeking for losses. Alternatively, it may be that risk 
simply plays a smaller role in the decision-making process during TSD than when 
individuals are well rested, which would equate to more of a true desensitization 
process. A third possibility is that subjects may subjectively weigh the value (or utility) of 
the possible outcomes as more extreme (better for gains and worse for losses) during 
TSD. This, too, would be expected to lead to more risk taking if the individual felt an 
outcome would be extremely good (i.e. a gain) and less risk taking when an outcome 
was valued as extremely bad (i.e. a loss). Finally, it is possible the changes observed 
here are not related to TSD-induced changes in risk preference, but rather to an 
increase in random responding or reduced motivation on the task. We do not believe 
this is the case, though, for at least three reasons. First, in examining the response 
patterns, there does not appear to be obviously random or effortless responding (e.g. no 
one selected all the ’left-hand column’ gambles across all choices). Second, we 
conducted a series of binomial tests to determine if changes in preferences after TSD 
were random. We found that: (a) whether a preference changed or not, and (b) the 
direction of that change (towards or away from the riskier option) was not random for 
both RG and RL conditions (each P < 0.01). Third, upon debriefing at the end of the 
experiment, subjects consistently reported that this was one of the most interesting and 
engaging aspects of the study, although this was not specifically quantified. 
 
Cognitive mechanisms leading to altered risk preference most likely result from changes 
in the actual neurophysiology of reward systems in the brain (Gomez-Beldarrain et al., 
2004; Knutson and Peterson, 2005; Rolls, 2000; Trepel et al., 2005). One way to test 
these potential mechanisms might be to examine functional changes during sleep loss 
in the neural networks important for evaluation of risk and/or the expectancy of 
outcomes during decision making. Prior work in this area has led to interesting findings 
that seem to show that activation of specific areas of the brain correlate with factors 
such as risk assessment (ventral striatum, prefrontal cortex and amygdala), risk 
preference (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), decision making (orbital frontal cortex) and 
reward (ventral striatum, prefrontal cortex, amygdala and hippocampus). Additional 
studies are needed to help better identify the relationship between these brain regions 
and objective measures of change in risk preference associated with TSD. 
 
Operational implications 
Regardless of the exact mechanism responsible for TSD-related changes in risk 
preference, these data hold implications for risk management in the operational context. 
For example, emergency personnel, doctors, and military personnel often must make 
decisions while sleep-deprived that directly influence lives. Business professionals who 
are traveling may need to enter negotiations or make strategic decisions while jet-
lagged and sleep deprived. Even in a more mundane setting, parents of young babies 
make many decisions every day in a variety of contexts that could be influenced by a 
lack of sleep. One important point this study raises is that while, in general, sensitivity to 
risk seems to be moderated or blunted by sleep deprivation, the exact effect of sleep 
deprivation on risk-related decisions depends on how those decisions are framed. 
Whether an individual sees a decision as involving gains or losses influences whether 
they are more or less willing to take risk. Thus, it may be important to help decision 
makers frame their decisions in the light required by a given context (e.g. is it better for 
a surgeon to consider that a risky procedure will prolong life or that it may result in 
death?). Furthermore, once a mechanism can be identified that underlies changes in 
risk preferences, it may be possible to develop training regimens to mitigate against 
those changes. 
 
Limitations 
There are some limitations with the present study which should be addressed. First, 
because the order of the sleep nights (normal sleep versus TSD) was fixed, there may 
be order effects which influence the reported changes in risk preference. The fixed 
order was a function of the design of the larger studies from which these data were 
drawn. To help control for order effects, though, a control group was added to examine 
any repeated administration effects with the LCT. The results from the control group 
suggest that there were no systematic changes in risk preference with repeated 
administration of the test. Thus, changes seen in the experimental group can be more 
confidently ascribed to TSD effects. Second, determination of ambiguity preferences 
required using the assumption of transitivity, which results in a number of individual 
decisions being classified as ’indeterminate’ with respect to ambiguity preference. 
Therefore, the total number of decisions used in the ambiguous-risk condition was 
reduced relative to the known-risk condition. The related loss of power may explain why 
there was no change across nights for the ambiguous condition. However, we do not 
believe this is likely to be the case, as the well-rested results are consistent with 
previous work (Smith et al., 2002). Nonetheless, further research could address the 
limitations in the present design regarding the assessment of ambiguity preferences by 
increasing the overall number of decisions made (which would result in a greater 
number of ’usable’ decisions) and/or by using a task that does not require the 
assumption of transitivity. Third, we administered relatively few trials per condition, 
raising the issue of whether we obtained a stable measure of preference scores. The 
lack of significant change in the control group data, though, suggests a reasonable level 
of stability. Regardless, future studies will likely want to increase the number of trials 
from which a risk or ambiguity preference score is obtained to increase confidence in 
the stability of the measures. Fourth, we focused here on very specific aspects of 
decision making with the goal of better isolating the impact of TSD on components of 
decision making than pervious studies. However, this also means that the types of 
decisions made by our subjects do not necessarily perfectly reflect those made outside 
the laboratory. For example, it is rare that one makes a decision involving risk where 
there is not the potential for both gains and losses. Future studies will want to 
systematically alter the types of decisions made in the context of sleep deprivation to 
bring them closer and closer to those made in everyday life, perhaps eventually 
incorporating actual simulations of real scenarios. Prior to that, though, research needs 
to experimentally study all the relevant aspects (or as many as possible) of those ’real-
life’ decisions so the interpretations of such simulation studies will be more valid and 
reliable. Fifth, we only used one task to assess the effects of TSD on risk and ambiguity 
preference in this study. Anytime only a single method is used to measure a given 
construct, there is concern about finding results that may be specific to that instrument. 
Future studies will want to use multiple methods for assessing risk preferences and 
changes in preferences related to sleep deprivation. 
 
In summary, we examined the effects of 23-h TSD on risk and ambiguity preferences 
during decision making. Results showed that, overall, risk preference is moderated by 
TSD, but whether an individual is willing to take more or less risk than when well-rested 
depends on whether the decision is framed in terms of gains or losses. This is the first 
study to specifically assess risk preference during TSD separately for gains and for 
losses, and the first to assess TSD effects on risk preferences without confounds of 
missing information, and our results hold important implications for risk management in 
operational settings. 
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